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Book Review
THE CRISIS OF ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION, by Ali A. Allawi 1
HAIDER ALA HAMOUDI 2
IT WOULD BE A CONSIDERABLE UNDERSTATEMENT to say that these are diffi-
cult times for the spiritual and devout Muslim. Assaulted by the non-religious
elite as retrograde, forced to defend his faith from the spiritually-barren and
puritannical Salafist movements that have come to dominate Sunni Islam,3 and
accused by Islamophobes who populate much of the right-wing United States
as a terrorist (or at least a terrorist dupe), the spiritual Muslim finds himself
beset by foes on all sides. Yet, unless one is to dismiss the substantial numbers
of devout Muslims in the world, the views of these Muslims deserve greater atten-
tion than they have been receiving. Surely we have heard and seen enough of
the cartoonish and ridiculous displays of Islam by its more fanatical adherents
(whether it be a conviction for witchcraft in Saudi Arabia, naming a teddy bear
"Muhammad" in Sudan, or countless other similar antics) to understand what
has gone wrong with Islam. It is, therefore, time to seriously engage with ideas
from the Muslim world about what it is that renders Islam so compelling to so
many, and what the sources of discontent are among Islam's devout and spiri-
tually committed community.
In this light, Ali A. Allawi's latest work, The Crisis of Islamic Civilization,
may be considered a worthy and valuable contribution, despite its flaws. Allawi
contends that Islamic civilization has been in a state of crisis that began around
the inception of the twentieth century, just as the Muslim caliphate was ending
and the colonial period was beginning.' Islamic civilization is not merely a com-
1. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009) 304 pages.
2. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
3. For more information on the problem of Salafism, and its dismissal of spiritualism in favour
of an idiosyncratic and selective literalism, see generally Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Great
Thejt: Wrestling Islamfrom the Extremists (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 2005).
4. Allawi, supra note 1 at 20.
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mitment to the vast body of norms and rules derived from the sacred Muslim
text known as the shari'a, although this is a fundamental aspect of it. Rather,
Islamic civilization is also, Allawi tells us, an entire manner of engaging with the
world. While it certainly encompasses the individual spiritual relationship with
God that is acquired through acts of piety, such as prayer and fasting, it also
extends to communal obligations, including notions of commercial and eco-
nomic order, and fundamental epistemological questions concerning the role of
the Divine in empirical inquiry.'
According to Allawi, the existential threat to Islamic civilization arose with
its replacement by a secularizing and modernizing West. As a result, Islam was
relegated to a realm where it could not comfortably lie: solely in the private
sphere. It was thereby excluded from setting rules of public order or establish-
ing the bounds and purposes of scientific inquiry. Allawi further regards the very
process of secularism as the attempted de-sacralization' of religious societies, the
destruction of reliance on "all supernatural myths and sacred symbols," and the
replacement of God with humanity as the force responsible for dealing with
life's challenges.
While this highly unsatisfactory state of affairs led to a form of Muslim
counter-revolt through the reassertion of particuI!r forms of shari', Allawi states
that the revolt took place decades after Islamic civilization had already begun to
crumble. 8 As a result, its fitful efforts to revive a genuine Islamic civilization are
insufficiently comprehensive. These efforts tend to focus, for example, on the
institution of shari'a as law, rather than on also re-engaging the Muslim popu-
lace on a spiritual basis. Scientific and technological advances developed by the
West, under a theory of radical skepticism toward the Divine, are accepted un-
critically by these Islamist forces, rather than being adopted in a manner that
accords with the demands of Islamic civilization.9 Even the Arabic language has
been altered in a manner that has disconnected it from Islam.10
Deeply dissatisfied with the current state of affairs in the Muslim world,
Allawi lets his frustrations fly in every conceivable direction-at the West for its
5. Ibid. at 16-20.
6. Ibid. at 89.
7. Ibid. at 96.
8. Ibid. at 83-84.
9. Ibid. at 232-33.
10. Ibid. at 89-90.
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condescending disregard of Islamic values and its messianic attempts to re-
make Islam in Christianity's image, at a secularizing elite for foolishly "aping""
the West and the secular edifices created by them in the Muslim world, and at
Islamists for failing to connect the spiritual to the temporal. He is neither san-
guine about the future of Islamic civilization, nor does he seem particularly in-
clined to disguise his bitterness at so much of what he finds distasteful in modern
Islam, modern Muslim society, and Western reactions thereto. Although Allawi
provides fresh insight on matters that deserve further scrutiny with sincerity, and
willingness to mince words, there is no reason he should veil his frustrations
with the current state of affairs when providing that insight.
While I appreciate, and even laud, much of Allawi's perspective on Islam
and its civilization, I cannot help but wonder whether his prescriptions for an
Islamic civilization are sensible, or entirely complete. Although it is relatively
easy to see what might be wrong, in the Islamic context, with the adoption of
the rather extreme views of secularism that he describes, it is unsatisfying that
the author is unwilling to engage with other, more promising possibilities within
the secular paradigm that have been promoted by other committed Muslims (as
will be demonstrated in Part II).
I. REALISM AND THE SHARI'A
The Islamic civilization is, in Allawi's words, "God-Centered."12 Islam rejects
entirely the notion that human beings are capable of "absolute autonomy" and
posits, instead, that they own a place in a moral, divinely ordered universe, with
rights and obligations determined by'God, whose will is ultimately ascertained
through reference to Muslim sacred text and human reason.13
This set of ideas is presented early in the book, and it is here that a central
difficulty first arises. To those of us influenced by the American Legal Realist
movement, it is hard to believe that sacred text and human reason provide ob-
jective, uncontroversial means to make legal determinations. Some of us regard
such claims rather skeptically in nearly any context. In any event, the principles
that Allawi regards as "core" and central to Islamic civilization are not nearly
as clear cut as he would like us to believe..The most glaring example from his
11. Ibid. at 50.
12. Ibid. at 12-13.
13. Ibid. at 13.
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book is the prohibition of interest on a loan. He describes the prohibition on
usury to be "core," and finance and finance capitalism, therefore, to be "hugely
problematic." 4 He insists that the prohibition on usury was historically un-
challenged by any "scholar of any note" because it "clearly was one of the abso-
lutely reprehensible acts condemned in the Qdiran."'' Yet, as Islamic civilization
crumbled, according to Allawi, Islamic modernists opened the door for the
payment of interest, and this permitted the entire takeover of Islamic economic
life by Western ideas and institutions. Islamic banking attempted for a time to
reverse this, but has now fallen back on transparent artifices to achieve interest-
based transactions in all but name. This is hardly the type of massive economic
transformation that would bring back a genuine Islamic civilization in Allawi's
view. 6
Unfortunately, Allawi's characterization of the classical Islamic position on
riba, the condemned practice to which he refers, lies somewhere between the
deeply reductive and the flatly wrong, bringing down with it any idea of the
necessity of massive economic transformation to build an Islamic civilization.
The reality is that the classical disquisitions on riba were focused on trades and
not loans.' 7 Six items were forbidden to be traded for gain, with delay: gold,
silver, wheat, barley, salt, and dates. From this prohibition, using analogical rea-
soning, classical jurists spun a dizzying array of categories of prohibition.S
However, when the question arose in North Africa as to whether copper
coins, orfi/us, were encompassed within the relevant prohibited categories, jurists
of one of the four orthodox schools of Sunni thought, the Maliki, took precisely
the position that Allawi describes as unthinkable: that the fulus were not covered
and therefore could be traded, for delay and with gain." As a result, two kilo-
14. Ibid. at 213.
15. Ibid. at 220 [emphasis added].
16. Ibid. at 220-22.
17. Abdul Razzaq AI-Sanhuri, "Masadir AI-Haqq fil Fiqh al-Islami [The Sources of Authority in
Islamic Jurisprudence]" (Lectures delivered at the Department of Legal Studies, Arab Studies
Institute, Cairo, 1953-1958) (Cairo: Ma'had al-Buhuth wa-al-Dirasat al-'Arabiyah, 1967)
vol. 3 at 34.
18. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, "The Muezzin's Call and the Dow Jones Bell: On the Necessity of
Realism in the Study of Islamic Law" (2008) 56 Am. J. Comp. L. 423 at 442-43.
19. Mahmoud A. EI-Gamal, Islamic Bank Corporate Governance and Regulation: A Call for
Mutualization (September 2005) at 12-13, online: <http://www.ruf.rice.edu/-elgamal/files/
IBCGR.pdf>. For a classical era criticism of this determination by a fellow prominent Maliki
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grams of gold could not be traded for a promise to pay back three kilograms in
a year, but forty copper coins could be traded for a promise to pay back forty-five
in a year. Even more troubling for Allawi's claim are established positions of
two other orthodox schools, the Shafi'i and Hanafi: that the sale and immediate
buyback of the same item at a higher price is entirely permissible.2" For example,
a creditor could sell Allawi's book to a borrower for ten dollars and have it sold
back to him for fifteen dollars, to be paid according to whatever schedule the
parties established. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that other prominent jurists,
including Ibn Rushd21 and Ibn Taymiyya" (ironically, given Allawi's distaste for
the latter),23 took alternative positions, which are at least arguably similar to
Allawi's in describing the nature and purposes of the riba prohibition.
It is, therefore, entirely possible to build an Islamic civilization using shari'a
as the signpost and guide, on the basis of interest-based lending and under a theory
that currency is not the type of item whose trade is covered by the riba prohibi-
tion. It is possible, again using shari'a, to ban interest, but permit artifice and
trickery so transparent that it would not even meet the current standards of Is-
lamic finance. It is also possible to develop theories of risk sharing on the basis
of other classical views of the riba ban, as Allawi has done.
This creates something of a dilemma, for now we are no longer dealing with
Islamic civilization as it actually existed, nor with shari'a as it was actually for-
mulated by the jurists "of note." Rather, we are dealing with a particular con-
ception of Islamic civilization with which others could take issue, credibly and
in good faith, drawing on juristic authority and historical praxis. Suddenly, it is
not so clear that Allawi is correct that Islamic civilization is in some sort of "crisis,"
except insofar as adherence to Islam in a fashion that he does not regard as suf-
ficiently Islamic is a crisis. This is not to discount or belittle his views, which
are well considered and refreshing, but only to suggest that the determination
jurist, see Ibn Rushd, BidyatAl-Mujtahid (Beirut: Dar Ibn Hazm, 1995) vol. 3. "[A]nd thus
we see that the legal cause ('ila) is narrow ... because it does not extend beyond gold and
silver" (at 1568-71) [translated by author].
20. Nicholas Dylan Ray, Arab Islamic Banking and the Renewal of Islamic Law (London: Graham
& Trotman, 1995) at 55-56.
21. Rushd, supra note 19 at 1071-72.
22. Ibn Taymiyya, MajmuAl-FatawaAl-Kubra (Beirut: Sharikat Dar al-Arqam, 1999) vol. 3
at 415-16.
23. Allawi, supra note 1 at 116-17.
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of what is or is not a "crisis" has less to do with "core" tenets of sacred text or
Islamic civilization in history than it does with ideological and ethical preference.
II. SLOUCHING TOWARDS LIBERALISM
One could avoid these difficulties of alternative, and equally legitimate, under-
standings of the underpinnings of Islamic civilization by deferring to the Muslim
community. That is to say, while we might concede that sacred texts are suffi-
ciently susceptible to multifold interpretations that, in turn, render a large
number of determinations subject to challenge, the community itself will ulti-
mately decide upon particular conclusions by consensus, or it will narrow the
acceptable choices to a finite number.
It is clear, however, that Allawi rejects this solution. In fact, his railing at
the excessive individualism of the West at the expense of community is rather
ironic, given how individualist he is. Allawi challenges the zeitgeist of the West
and the East alike, yet for all of his assault on the Western notion of Prome-
theus, he himself proves to be the paradigmatic Promethean by breaking from
the shackles of Western orthodoxies, as well as those prevailing in his native
Iraq. The author's previous work concerning post-war Iraq was deservedly re-
garded as a triumph precisely because he was so willing to correct and challenge
the perspectives and prescriptions of the relevant actors.2" One wonders if a
society that did not value the individual as highly as the West could have pro-
duced the contrarian, individualistic Allawi, who is an alumnus of MIT and
Harvard.
In light of this, it is somewhat distressing that he does not engage more se-
riously with theories of secularism that might permit individual achievement and
also provide space for the promulgation of metaphysical truths in a communal,
public form. Allawi prefers only to address versions of secularism that would
obviously be troublesome for any committed Muslim-the denial of special
protection to religion, the replacement of God with humanity as the ultimate
arbiter of human affairs, and the banning of religious dress in public life.25 The
relationship of Islam and shari'a to forms of secular liberalism that committed
Muslims might find acceptable (which have been the subject of some ferment
24. See Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation offraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven:
Yale University, 2007).
25. Ibid. at 96, 98, 254-55.
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in our academy, from Mohammad Fadel at the University of Toronto,2 ' to An-
drew F. March at Yale,27 to Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im at Emory),28 are not
discussed in Allawi's work.
This is unfortunate, as his contribution would have been richer had he not
insisted at tiresome length on repeating the self-evident proposition that a com-
mitted Muslim will have trouble with a system that seeks the death of God. The
more pertinent theory of secularism is not one that de-sacralizes29 society, but
rather one that provides a space wherein disparate and inconsistent transcendental
theories of the good can coexist on a neutral plane. Free exercise of religion is,
in this formulation, as fundamental to the secular state as disestablishment. The
state resolutely disclaims any claim to metaphysical truth and absolutely permits
groups (in fact, protects groups) to seek such truths on their own, subject only
to commitments to engage on the political and legal level with other communi-
ties on the basis of public reason and discourse accessible to all. Why this would
not be a better outcome is mystifying, given that if a God-centered civilization
based on shari'a and historical praxis were to arrive now, surely it would look
nothing like what the author envisions. It would be as likely to dismiss his vision
as he is to dismiss dominant Islamist notions.
This problem in Alawi's work extends beyond the theoretical into the prac-
tical. The author mertions headscarf bans in Turkey and France, but fails to
note that a law specifically targeting and prohibiting religious dress is a clear
violation of constitutional mandate in the United States.3" Had Allawi looked
to Canada, he would have found a nation that provides even greater protection,
going so far as to permit Sikh children to wear ceremonial knives to school as
part of a religious obligation. 1 Allawi points to the extensive, 'and troubling,
26. Mohammad Fadel, "The Tre, the Good and the Reasonable: The Theological and Ethical
Roots of Public Reason in Islamic Law" (2008) 21 Can. J. L. & Jurisprudence 5.
27. Andrew F. March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
28. Abdullahi Ahmed An.Na'im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari'a
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008).
29. Allawi, supra note 1 at 89.
30. See e.g. Church ofthe Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., et al. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
"At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue
discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it
is undertaken for religious reasons" (at 532).
31. Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [20061 S.C.R. 256.
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disaffection of Muslims in Europe, but does not note that US Muslims12 are
roughly as wealthy, as satisfied, and as convinced of their ability to advance
through hard work as their non-Muslim counterparts. 3
Allawi's omission is unfortunate, because the academy in North America
does seem enthralled with the type of liberalism that seeks to provide a neutral
space where conflicting notions of transcendant good in the same public order
can coexist and thrive. We, in North America, deserve a challenge, and few are
in better position to deliver it than Allawi; he is a committed Muslim, educated
in the West, who held prominent government positions in one Muslim coun-
try, is a witness to various cultures and civilizations, and is plainly unafraid to
express his mind. While he does lead us through a fascinating journey of his
own view of Islamic civilization and history, and provides extensive fodder for
discussion, he fails to squarely confront some of the central orthodoxies of Islam
and secularism among those who take both quite seriously.
32. Unfortunately, I have been unable to locate comparable data for Canada to that of the Pew
Research Center poll that is cited, infra note 33, in the context of the United States.
33. Pew Research Center, Muslim Americans: Midle Class and Mostly Mainstream (22 May
2007), online: <http:llpewresearch.orglassets/pdflmuslim-americans.pdf>.
